Our article addresses the question how to assess and measure the value or price of knowledge, and probes the issue from a variety of social scientific and practical perspectives. Against the background of a sociological concept of knowledge, economic, political, social, and juridical perspectives that may lead to a price of knowledge are discussed. We observe that knowledge is seen to play an ever greater role within as well as across economies and politics; that its embodiment makes it difficult to (...) divorce it from its carriers; and that knowledge is deeply entrenched in questions of social relations and stratification. As such, it is cannot be captured in a straightforward manner, especially given the persistent stand-off between its individual, economic, and public relevancies and benefits. A simple arithmetic of the price of knowledge fails. (shrink)

At a time when the formerly strictly separated roles of citizen and consumer are arguably blurry, and when once powerful social institutions increasingly must yield to new social forces based on heightened knowledgeability and historically unprecedented wealth, it is likely that the economy of modern society is also subject to implicit changes. In this article, we argue that traditional theories of the market are increasingly losing their basis for analysing economic relationships as purely rational acts of exchange and utility maximization. (...) Instead, what can be witnessed is an increase in the influence of values and norms on markets, guiding our attention to how deeply embedded economic action is in modern culture. We put forward the idea of a moralization of markets, which has begun to change our conceptions and theories regarding what is at stake in a modern economy fundamentally. We conclude that in the future, production processes and standards, codes of conduct and consumer reasoning will become all the more important for doing business in Western knowledge societies. (shrink)

Having been used in various guises and debates for quite some time the notion of mediatization (and related concepts such as mediation or medialization) promises to expand the horizon of media and communication research. Casting the role of the media in and for current western societies as ever more central employing a range of theoretical approaches, mediatization could help to further advance our knowledge of the role of mediated communication for the creation of social realities today. Still, the recent interest (...) in the conceptual framework has also caused confusion as to which approaches are compatible, to which methodological scope the concept extends and what its theoretical and ideational roots are. This article tries to sort through the wealth of conceptual propositions in order to clarify a research approach that might help to reunite social, cultural and communication theory in the face of today's media culture. (shrink)

Our paper offers a contribution to the growing literature on the sociology of innovation rather than the still dominant economic theory of innovation. We suggest that innovation first and foremost represents a process of cognitive displacement whereby existing metaphorical frameworks are reconstituted to account for new phenomena in a process that changes both the metaphor’s and the new phenomenon’s compositions. We suggest that integral to this process is knowledgeability, or a bundle of social and cognitive competencies that emerge as one (...) of the main prerequisites for innovative thinking. We conclude by examining the most important social and cognitive competencies that structure the possibilities for invention and innovation in the contemporary knowledge economy. (shrink)

Consider where κ is an uncountable regular cardinal. By a result of Shelah's we have for almost all witnessing this. Here we consider the question if there could be a similar result for. We will discuss some basic facts implying that this cannot hold in general. We will use these facts to construct an interesting example of a pseudo Prikry forcing, answering a question of Sinapova.

The precarious rights of senior citizens, especially those who are highly educated and who are expected to counsel and guide the younger generations, has stimulated the creation internationally of advocacy associations and opinion leader groups. The strength of these groups, however, varies from country to country. In some countries, they are supported and are the focus of intense interest; in others, they are practically ignored. For this is reason we believe that the creation of a network of all these associations (...) is essential. The proposed network would act as a support for the already-existing policies of the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights, of independent experts, and of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Older People. All three have long ago recommended the creation of a recognized instrument for uniting presently scattered efforts. The proposed network, therefore, will seek to promote the international exchange of relevant expertise, and it will reinforce the commitments and actions that single countries are currently taking to meet these objectives. For example, informative public events can be organised to promote particular support initiatives and to provide an opportunity for new members of the network to be presented. The network will promote health for senior citizens, disease prevention, senior mobility, safe free time for seniors, alimentary education, protection against new risks and dangers, as well as equity in the services necessary for seniors to adopt new information and communication technologies. In the case of retired academic members, the network will promote equality with respect to continuing use of digital technologies (particularly email), continuing access to research libraries, and the guaranteed ability for seniors to fund their own research programs and to deliver free seminars. (shrink)

The paper deals with the ethical-moral dimension of Popper’s critical rationalism, which is the less analyzed aspect of his philosophy. Critical rationalism is not without assumptions. As a life attitude, it is actualized on the basis of one’s moral preferences based rather on assumptions than on critical reasonableness. Critical rationalism does not exclude logical argumentation and reasoning, but the adoption of them is predominantly the result of an individual moral decision and choice, based, paradoxically enough, on an irrational belief in (...) reason. The author considers this attitude to be productive, as it emphasizes individual moral responsibility. Nobody is able to persuade us about the relevance of what we don’t want to adopt and apply. Thus we find ourselves in the sphere of personal morality. (shrink)

Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.

The T-biconditionals, also known as T-sentences or T-equivalences, play a very prominent role in contemporary work on truth. It is widely held that they are so central to our understanding of truth that conformance with them is indispensable to any account of truth that aspires to be adequate. Even “deflationists” and “inflationists” tend to agree on this point; their debate turns largely on just how central a role these biconditionals can play in a theory of truth. In the present paper, (...) I want to bracket this debate about their “theoretical role” and focus on the T- biconditionals themselves. They are typically presented as entirely unproblematic, as models of simplicity, clarity, and obviousness. I confess that I find them rather more puzzling than that. The main purpose of the paper is to reflect on some of these biconditionals and to survey and explore some doubts one might have about their virtues. (shrink)

« Lorsque la philosophie peint sa grisaille dans la grisaille, une manifestation de la vie achève de vieillir. On ne peut pas la rajeunir avec du gris sur du gris, mais seulement la connaître. Ce n’est qu’au début du crépuscule que la chouette de Minerve prend son vol. » G. F. W. Hegel, Principes de la philosophie du droit La métaphore de Hegel concernant le retard de la philosophie sur le réel pourrait s’appliquer aussi au cas de l’anthropologie du socialisme (...) réel qui émerge comme champ de t.. (shrink)

Die minimalistische Konzeption der Wahrheit wurde von Paul Horwich als eine Variante des Wahrheitsdeflationismus in die Diskussion eingeführt. Diese Konzeption gilt gegenwärtig als eine, wenn nicht die plausibelste Darlegung des deflationistischen Standpunkts. Dennoch wurde diese Konzeption in den letzten Jahren mit einer ganzen Reihe von Einwänden konfrontiert, um deren Ausräumung sich Paul Horwich ausführlich bemüht hat. Im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit werde ich Horwichs minimalistische Konzeption der Wahrheit im Vergleich zu Alstons minimalistischer Konzeption der Wahrheit darlegen und ihre Vorzüge gegenüber (...) Alstons Konzeption herausarbeiten. Im zweiten Teil werde ich sechs unterschiedliche Probleme von Horwichs minimalistischer Konzeption der Wahrheit anführen und diskutieren. Auf dieser Grundlage wird sich zeigen, inwiefern sich der minimalistische Standpunkt verteidigen oder modifizieren läßt und wo die zentralen Schwächen dieses Standpunkts liegen. (shrink)

O texto a seguir corresponde ao §3, pp. 705–718, do livro “Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts” (“Os Fundamentos a priori do Direito Civil”), originalmente publicado em 1913 no Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, pp. 685–847. A numeração inserida entre colchetes no corpo do texto, destacada em negrito, refere-se à paginação desta edição. As palavras destacadas em negrito pelos tradutores remetem a um glossário que acompanha a presente tradução. Os itálicos, porém, são do próprio Reinach. A marca de intercalação (...) “ ” foi usada para introduzir expressões que estão apenas implícitas no texto original. Existem ainda as seguintes reedições desse livro: 1921 Gesammelte Schriften. Halle, Niemeyer, pp. 166–350. 1953 Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts. Munich: Kose t, 215 pp. 1989 Sämtliche Werke, vol. 1: Die Werke. Munique: Philosophia, 1989, pp. 141–278. (shrink)

Die Frage nach der Existenz von Propositionen, aufgefaßt als abstrakte und allgemeine Gegenstände, ist einer der Zankäpfel des Universalienstreites in seiner heutigen Form. Da der Verfasser in diesem Streit auf der Seite jener steht, die, wie Piaton sagt, "alles aus dem Himmel und dem Unsichtbaren auf die Erde herabziehen", werden einige Überlegungen angestellt, die darauf abzielen, platonistische Argumente zu unterminieren, welche häufig im Rahmen einer realistischen Bedeutungstheorie sowie im Rahmen der Theorie von der Intentionalität des Mentalen vorgebracht werden, um uns (...) von der Notwendigkeit der Annahme von Propositionen zu überzeugen. (shrink)

Die Frage nach der Existenz von Propositionen, aufgefaßt als abstrakte und allgemeine Gegenstände, ist einer der Zankäpfel des Universalienstreites in seiner heutigen Form. Da der Verfasser in diesem Streit auf der Seite jener steht, die, wie Piaton sagt, "alles aus dem Himmel und dem Unsichtbaren auf die Erde herabziehen", werden einige Überlegungen angestellt, die darauf abzielen, platonistische Argumente zu unterminieren, welche häufig im Rahmen einer realistischen Bedeutungstheorie sowie im Rahmen der Theorie von der Intentionalität des Mentalen vorgebracht werden, um uns (...) von der Notwendigkeit der Annahme von Propositionen zu überzeugen. (shrink)

In earlier writings, I argued that neither of the two major physical cosmologies of the twentieth century support divine creation, so that atheism has nothing to fear from the explanations required by these cosmologies. Yet theists ranging from Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz to Richard Swinburne and Philip Quinn have maintained that, at every instant anew, the existence of the world requires divine creation ex nihilo as its cause. Indeed, according to some such theists, for any given moment t, God’s (...) volition thatthe-world-should-exist-at-t supposedly brings about its actual existence at t.In an effort to establish the current viability of this doctrine of perpetual divine conservation. Philip Quinn I argued that it is entirely compatible with physical energy-conservation in the Big Rang cosmology, as well as with the physics of the steady-state theories.But I now contend that instead, there is a logical incompatibility on both counts. Resides, the stated tenet of divine conservation has an additional defect: It speciously purchases plausibility by trading on the multiply disanalogous volitional explanations of human actions. (shrink)

The issue of the crisis of democracy has been debated abundantly and intensively in recent years. The body of academic literature on the topic has gradually increased. However, a similar debate took place almost one-hundred years ago in the Central European region. At that time, the debate was closely intertwined with the geopolitical situation, especially with the rise of fascism and Nazism. The paper conceptualizes the intellectual discussion on the reasons of the democratic crisis in the 1930s in Czechoslovakia from (...) a sociological and philosophical perspective. The opinions of important Czech intellectuals, such as František Modráček, Emanuel Rádl, Karel Čapek, Edvard Beneš, František Žilka, F.X. Šalda, T.G. Masaryk, J.B. Kozák, and J.L. Fischer, are clarified. Furthermore, some main features of the nature of the past and present crises of democracy are compared. (shrink)

In earlier writings, I argued that neither of the two major physical cosmologies of the 20th century support divine creation, so that atheism has nothing to fear from the explanations required by these cosmologies. Yet theists ranging from Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz to Richard Swinburne and Philip Quinn have maintained that, at every instant anew, the existence of the world requires divine creation ex nihilo as its cause. Indeed, according to some such theists, for any given moment t. God's (...) volition that the-world-should-exist-at-t supposedly brings about its actual existence at t. In an effort to reestablish the current viability of this doctrine of perpetual divine conservation. Philip Quinn argued (1993) that it is entirely compatible with physical energy conservation in the Big Bang cosmology, as well as with the physics of the steady-state theories. But I now contend that instead, there is a logical incompatibility on both counts. Besides, the stated tenet of divine conservation has an additional defect: It speciously purchases plausibility by trading on the multiply disanalogous volitional explanations of human actions. (shrink)

Larry Laudan has recently advanced a philosophy of science that appears to answer both Kuhnian critics of the rationality of science, on the one hand, and interpretive and critical theorists' objections to a naturalistic social science, on the other. Like Lakatos before him, Laudan argues that scientific progress is indeed a rational affair. But Laudan goes one step further, arguing that his analysis yields a set of rational criteria for theory choice. In addition, Laudan explicitly claims that the standard he (...) proposes can be applied in any realm of empirical inquiry. Employing a case study of the development of strategic doctrine during the Cold War period, I show this latter claim to be false. Because Laudan's standard for theory choice depends on an exclusively cognitive calculus, it cannot account for, much less help us weigh, the practical implications of theory choice. I conclude that such an accounting procedure may be appropriate for the natural sciences but can hardly be adequate in the realm of thermonuclear politics, where theory choice carries with it potentially catastrophic practical consequences. More generally, choosing from among competing political theories must make explicit room for discursive argument. (shrink)

The paper aims to weaken a widespread argument against indexical contextualism regarding matters of personal taste. According to indexical contextualism, an utterance of “T is tasty” (where T is an object of taste) expresses the proposition that T is tasty for J (where J is a judge). This argument suggests that indexical contextualism cannot do justice to our disagreement intuitions regarding typical disputes about personal taste because it has to treat conversations in which one speaker utters “T is tasty” and (...) another responds with “T is not tasty” (referred to as ‘judge-non-specific conversations’ in this paper) as being on a par with conversations in which one speaker utters “T is tasty to me” and another responds with “T is not tasty to me” (referred to as ‘judge-specific conversations’). The argument has it that judge-specific conversations, unlike judge-non-specific conversations, do not contain disagreement between speakers. To defend indexical contextualism, some philosophers have proposed accounts (here referred to as ‘dual-proposition theories’) according to which utterances of “T is tasty” are used to communicate both the above kinds of semantically expressed proposition and some other kinds of proposition (like superiority propositions or metalinguistic propositions) that could be used to explain disagreements about taste. The paper defends two claims: First, it is argued that judge-specific conversations, or at least some of them, do contain disagreement between speakers, contrary to what the anti-indexical-contextualist argument supposes. Second, it is argued that dual-proposition indexical-contextualist theories fail to explain judge-specific conversations that are intuitively interpreted as containing disagreement. (shrink)

In Grunbaum (1989, 374, 390), I objected to Narlikar's (1977, 136-137) designation "event of 'creation'" for a supposed first cosmic instant t = 0, which he imports into the big bang cosmology of the general theory of relativity (GTR). Narlikar (1992, 361-362) does reject a theological construal of the "creation". But, endeavoring to justify his secular creationism, he now points out that, in the GTR, the usual derivation of matter-energy conservation from Hilbert's stationary action principle cannot be extended to include (...) the putative first instant t = 0. Narlikar reasons that this "breakdown" in the derivation of energy conservation at t = 0 qualifies the putative initial event as the "creation event". I argue that this inference is multiply fallacious. (shrink)

The following remarks should be treated as a discussion of a semiotic claim posed in the quotation above. Kołakowski opted for this rather radical perspective to challenge semiotic views prevailing in the analytical philosophy of that day. No wonder that his intellectual opponents felt obliged to take a stand. I once tended to side with his opponents, which is one of the reasons why I would like to take the emerging opportunity and revisit Kołakowski’s argument. I won’t be discussing the (...) meaning of expressions in general, my purpose here is rather to, as the title suggests, bring into focus the meaning of non-literal expressions, particularly where they are supplied with inverted commas to imply their non-literal, metaphorical character. I chose to pursue this particular topic because there is little agreement as to what they actually mean. (shrink)

Starting with a very brief account of the way language's relation to music was conceived before the nineteenth century, Malcolm Bowie's relation to music is considered by close textual analysis of two passages from his work on Mallarmé. I argue that it is through reference to music that Bowie is able to suggest non-closure even in Mallarmé’s use of the archetypal closed form, the sonnet; and through reference to music that Mallarmé’s non-trivial triviality can be handled in a new way. (...) Bowie doesn't posture or postulate through a dialectics, nor stay still by stationary even-handedness. In his way of writing, the reader is neither fired up nor sedated: he or she has to react to muted mini-dramas, which break out in each sentence but which are contained in a clearly directed tone of scholarly criticism. (shrink)

Dirac's classical electrodynamics countenances "preaccelerations" of charged particles at a time t as mathematical functions of external forces applied after the time t. These preaccelerations have been interpreted as evidence for physical retrocausation upon assuming that, in electrodynamics no less than in Newton's second law, external forces sustain an asymmetric causal relation to accelerations. And this retrocausal interpretation has just been defended against the critiques in (Grunbaum 1976), (Grunbaum and Janis, 1977 and 1978) by appeal to the formal assimilation of (...) the electrodynamic laws of motion to Newton's second law. It is argued below that this latest defense of the retrocausal interpretation is even more ill-founded than the prior ones in the literature. (shrink)

Bibliography of A. A. Fraenkel (p. ix-x)--Axiomatic set theory. Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre, von P. Bernays.--On some problems involving inaccessible cardinals, by P. Erdös and A. Tarski.--Comparing the axioms of local and universal choice, by A. Lévy.--Frankel's addition to the axioms of Zermelo, by R. Mantague.--More on the axiom of extensionality, by D. Scott.--The problem of predicativity, by J. R. Shoenfield.--Mathematical logic. Grundgedanken einer typenfreien Logik, von W. Ackermann.--On the use of Hilbert's [epsilon]-operator in scientific theories, (...) by R. Carnap.--Basic verifiability in the combinatory theory of restricted generality, by H. B. Curry.--Uniqueness ordinals in constructive number classes, by H. Putnam.--On the construction of models, by A. Robinson.--Interpretation of mathematical theories in the first order predicate calculus, by T. Skolem.--The elementary character of two notions from general algebra, by R. Vaught.--Foundations of arithmetic and analysis. Axiomatic method and intuitionism, by A. Heyting.--On rank-decreasing functions, by G. Kurepa.--On non-standard models for number theory, by E. Mendelson.--Concerning the problem of axiomatizability of the field of real numbers in the weak second order logic, by A. Mostowski.--Non-standard models and independence of the induction axiom, by M. O. Rabin.--Sur les ensembles raréfiés de nombres naturels, par W. Sierpinski.--Philosophy of logic and mathematics. Remarks on the paradoxes of logic and set theory, by E. W. Beth.--Logique formalisée et raisonnement juridique, par R. Feys.--Im Umkreis der sogenannten Raumprobleme, von H. Freudenthal.--Process and existence in mathematics, by H. Wang. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Religion and Public Policy: Human Rights, Conflict, and Ethics ed. by Sumner B. Twiss, Marian Simion, and Rodney L. PetersenJoshua T. MauldinReligion and Public Policy: Human Rights, Conflict, and Ethics Edited by Sumner B. Twiss, Marian Simion, and Rodney L. Petersen NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2015. 372 PP. $99.00This festschrift in honor of David Little canvasses the range of topics Little explored during a distinguished (...) career. The breadth of Little's research interests is reflected in the diversity of essays represented in the volume. Some of the seventeen chapters reflect directly on issues within Little's corpus while others discuss the influence Little had on various fields of inquiry or draw on his ideas for new areas of research.John Witte and Gene Outka provide essays of the first sort: Witte examines Little's work on the religious origins of human rights, while Outka raises questions about how Little's historical work on Reformed Protestantism relates to his work in human rights. Outka raises broader questions about methodology in religious ethics, questions also explored in a chapter by John Kelsay. These include foundationalism, the role of normativity in the study of religion, and the role of expressly theological concepts in religious ethics. The questions are intertwined but played out in different ways in Little's scholarly career; the first [End Page 224] two issues arose in response to the 1978 volume, Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method, which was foundationalist in orientation. It sought to find the "basic" norm that was the ground of all other moral ideas in a religious system, whether Christianity, Buddhism, or the religion of the Navajo. Jeffrey Stout's critique of the book's foundationalist assumptions struck a serious blow to the project; in response, Little conceded so many of Stout's points that Stout questioned whether the methodology of the volume was meant to be taken seriously. As Kelsey notes in his chapter, some wondered whether the rigid methodology of Comparative Religious Ethics was created primarily to give religious ethicists a respectable job to do in an academic environment in which the study of religion was otherwise suspect. It sought to create a neo-Weberian study of religious ethical systems in which the scholar bracketed out her own ethical assumptions. Through this "value-free" descriptive science, the comparative ethicist hoped to gain admission to the secular academy. Foundationalism was meant to provide the kind of objectivity that gave the religious ethicist something objective to study. Giving up foundationalism would mean giving up the hope of comparative religious ethics as a science.This brings us to the role of distinctly theological claims in Little's work. When putting on the normative hat of the ethicist, Little preferred to bracket out theological assumptions, precisely in order to maintain conversation with his nonreligious interlocutors. The benefits of such a method are evident in this volume. Little managed to engage in moral and political conversation with scholars across a variety of religious, political, and national locations. As is clear in Little's afterword to this volume, he believes that bracketing out his first-order theological assumptions made this dialogue possible. But how can we be sure that this is the case? Perhaps other intellectual and moral virtues allowed this dialogue to flourish, and perhaps Little's virtues would have made such a dialogue possible, even had he been more open about his theological assumptions all along the way. It's hard to know for sure. But in light of the difficulties involved in bracketing out first-order theological assumptions, perhaps the better option is to make one's assumptions explicit while remaining willing to change one's mind when given compelling reasons to do so. That, it seems to me, is what it means to be reasonable—and this is compatible with holding theological beliefs. [End Page 225]Joshua T. MauldinCenter of Theological InquiryCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S3-S11, March‐April 2022.

In the context of acknowledging the contrast between Marian devotional life and eucharistic theology, this response to Díaz’s book makes several connections between the two, including a glimpse into Rahner’s own devotional piety. While affirming and approving the overall content of this study by Díaz, the respondent uses a more recent article by Rahner to suggest four topics that might have enhanced the book: 1) how Marian devotion is founded on the doctrine of the communion of the saints; (...) 2) how Mary’s unimportance and marginalized position enhanced her unique acceptance of grace for the sake of all humanity; 3) how Rahner’s emphasis on women’s equality can figure in the present theological conversation about the relevance of Jesus’ maleness; and 4) how there is room inthe church for a variety of individual and cultural approaches to the theology of grace and to the devotional life of the faithful. (shrink)

Im dreizehnten Aphorismus von Jenseits von Gut und Böse distanziert sich Nietzshe von Spinozas Begriff der Selbsterhaltung. Hierfür gibt Nietzsche zwei Gründe an: Zum einen hält er den Selbsterhaltungstrieb, als Prinzip genommen, für überflüssig und setzt ihm den Willen zur Macht als fundamentaleres, die Selbsterhaltung bereits in sich begriefendes Prinzip entgegen. Zum anderen sei besagter Trieb zudem noch eine "Inconsequenz", sofern Spinozas antiteleologisches System durch den teleologischen Gedanken der Selbsterhaltung unterminiert werde. Die Abhandlung macht Adolf Trendelenburgs Aufsatz Ueber Spinoza's (...) Grundgedanken und dessen Erfolg als mutmaßliche Quelle für Nietzsches Diktum "Inconsequenz Spinoza's" ausfinding und umreißt kurz Trendelenburgs diesbezügliche Argumentation. Im Anschluss daran wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Nietzsche's Kritik an Spinoza ihre berechtigung hat, oder ob sie selbst inkonsequent ist.In the thirteenth aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche refuses Spinoza's concept of self-preservation. Nietzsche gives two reasons: First, he considers self-preservation a superfluous principle while the will to power is a more fundamental one. Secondly, Nietzsche calls the self-preservation an "inconsistency" since it would ruin Spinoza's anti-teleological system by infiltrating it with a teleological concept. The article detects Adolf Trendelburg's treatise Ueber Spinoza's Grundgedanken und desen Erfolog as most likely to be the source of Nietzsche's words "Spinoza's inconsistency" and summarize Trendelenburg's argumentation against Spinoza. Afterwards it is discussed whether Nietzsche's criticism at Spinoza is accurate or inconsistent itself. (shrink)

Anhand von unveröffentlichten Briefen an die Herausgeber Hans Delbrück und Karl Muth wird im vorliegenden Beitrag nachgewiesen: Bernarda von Nell, die Mutter des Jesuitenpaters und Sozialethikers Oswald von Nell-Breuning, ist die Verfasserin des anonymen Artikels „Wie denkt Professor Harnack über die Enzyklika Pascendi?“ . Ihr Angriff auf Adolf Harnack ist Teil einer über Jahre andauernden, teils kritischen, teils bewundernden Auseinandersetzung mit dem protestantischen Gelehrten. Harnacks Antwort an die – ihm namentlich bekannte – Angreiferin ist vor dem Hintergrund seiner Unterstützung (...) für das „Bildungsstreben der Frauen“ zu sehen.Anhang; aus: A. Harnack, Die päpstliche Enzyklika des Jahres 1907. Ein Schlußwort.*[Man ist] der Enzyklika die Erklärung schuldig, die mir in den Kritiken kaum entgegengetreten ist, daß sie nach langer, langer Zeit von höchster katholischer Stelle die Glaubens- und Weltanschauungsfrage, nicht aber die Frage des Papsttums, in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Wir sind daran gewöhnt worden, von Rom aus vor allem diese Frage uns aufgerückt zu sehen; in der Enzyklika aber tritt sie ganz hinter jene andere zurück. Ich stehe nicht an, darin einen Fortschritt zu erkennen. Fast möchte ich sagen, der Papst rüttelt die Gewissen seiner Gläubigen auf! Sollten wir uns darüber nicht freuen? Er zwingt sie freilich alsbald auf einen ganz bestimmten Weg und bringt seine Macht in den Disziplinarvorschriften, die er erläßt, in eine fürchterliche Erinnerung; aber er lenkt ihre Aufmerksamkeit doch auf Glaubensfragen, er lenkt sie auf den „Modernismus“, den er nicht ohne Aufbieten von Kenntnissen eingehend schildert! Er nimmt also die unausbleiblichen Folgen aller geistigen Unruhe in den Kauf, weil er die Sache, den wahren, rechten Glauben, für so wichtig hält. Wäre es ihm nur um die eigene Herrschaft zu tun, so wäre diese Enzyklika das ungeschickteste Schriftstück von der Welt – es ist ihm wirklich um den christlichen Glauben und die rechte Theologie zu tun, wie er sie versteht, also um das Seelenheil seiner Gläubigen! Das soll man nicht verkennen, und darin liegt bei aller Rückständigkeit in bezug auf das Wesen des Wahrheitssinns und der Wissenschaft doch ein erfreuliches Moment. Auch wird ja der Versuch gemacht, den „Modernismus“ zu widerlegen, und so kläglich dieser Versuch auch ausgefallen ist – einige unvermeidliche Schatten und Fehler der modernen Wissenschaft sind nicht ungeschickt benutzt, und auf die Abgründe, die sie umgeben, ist nicht ohne Recht hingewiesen.Drawing its evidence from hitherto unpublished letters to the editors Hans Delbrück and Karl Muth , the present study proves the following fact: Bernarda von Nell, mother of the Jesuit priest and professor of social ethics Oswald von Nell-Breuning, is the author the anonymous article „Wie denkt Professor Harnack über die Enzyklika Pascendi?“ . This attack on Adolf Harnack is part of her continuous, sometimes critical, sometimes admiring discussion of the protestant scholar. Harnack’s reply to his challenger – known to him by name – should be appreciated in connection with his public support of “women’s pursuit of education”. (shrink)

Die Studienausgabe der Mitschrift Adolf Heimanns von Hegels letzter Berliner Ästhetikvorlesung im Winter 1828/29 schließt die exemplarische Dokumentation einzelner Quellen aus den Jahren 1820/21, 1823 und 1826 ab. Zudem ist diese Quelle die einzige erhaltene Nachschrift von 1828/29, die H.G. Hotho für die Edition der Ästhetik genutzt hat. Heimanns Mitschrift der letzten Berliner Ästhetikvorlesung informiert über eine Reihe von Neuerungen. Die wohl wichtigste ist die von Hegel eingangs vorgetragene, an der Enzyklopädie von 1827 orientierte, differenzierte Bestimmung der Bedeutung der (...) Kunst für die moderne Welt. An die Stelle einer inhaltlichen Orientierung durch Kunst setzt Hegel die These ihrer Funktion als Stimulans der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der abend- und morgenländischen Kultur. Auf dieser Basis diskutiert er einzelne Kunstwerke, aktuelle Kunstereignisse und Theorien seiner Zeitgenossen. (shrink)

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and (...) second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ. (shrink)

This paper offers a refutation of P. Duhem's thesis that the falsifiability of an isolated empirical hypothesis H as an explanans is unavoidably inconclusive. Its central contentions are the following: 1. No general features of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every isolated empirical hypothesis H and independently of the domain to which it pertains, that H can always be preserved as an explanans of any empirical findings O whatever by some modification of the auxiliary assumptions A in conjunction (...) with which H functions as an explanans. For Duhem cannot guarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility of O from an explanans constituted by the conjunction of H and some revised non-trivial version R of A: the existence of the required set R of collateral assumptions must be demonstrated for each particular case. 2. The categorical form of the Duhemian thesis is not only a non-sequitur but actually false. This is shown by adducing the testing of physical geometry as a counterexample to Duhem in the form of a rebuttal to A. Einstein's geometrical articulation of Duhem's thesis. 3. The possibility of a quasi a priori choice of a physical geometry in the sense of Duhem must be clearly distinguished from the feasibility of a conventional adoption of such a geometry in the sense of H. Poincare. And the legitimacy of the latter cannot be invoked to save the Duhemian thesis from refutation by the foregoing considerations. (shrink)